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Abstract
This research aims to examine diff erences in the relationship of bureaucratic and political offi  cials 
during the New Order (Soeharto’s era) and the Reformation (post-Soeharto) era within the arena 
of public policy implementation. This is a matt er of importance given that there is a change in 
relations between the two from integration in the New Order to bureaucratic impartiality in 
the Reformation Era. This study att empts to answer the question: How were the relations of 
bureaucratic and political offi  cials in the implementation of local level public policy during 
the New Order and the Reformation Era? A qualitative research has been conducted in Tegal 
Municipality using the following data collection techniques: interview, focus group discussion, 
documentation, and observation. Tegal Municipality was selected as the study location because 
of the unique relationship shown between the mayor and the bureaucracy. Its uniqueness lies 
in the emergence of bureaucratic offi  cials who dare to oppose political offi  cials, based on their 
convictions that bureaucratic/public values should be maintained even if it means having to be 
in direct  confl ict with political offi  cials. This research indicates that the relationship between 
bureaucratic and political offi  cials in the arena of local level policy implementation during the 
New Order was characterized as being full of pressure and compliance, whereas during the 
Reformation Era bureaucrats have the audacity to hinder policy implementation. Such audacity to 
thwart policies is considered to have developed from a stance that aims to protect public budget 
and values in policies. The occurring confl ict of values here demonstrates a dichotomy of political 
and bureaucratic offi  cials that is diff erent from the prevailing defi nition of politics-administration 
dichotomy introduced at the onset of Public Administration studies. 
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Introduction
In  the  New Order,  bureaucra ts 
and political officials were not distinctly 
distinguishable. This is due to the reality at 
the time that the bureaucracy had become 
the power of the government through its 
engagement as a member of Golongan Karya 
(Golkar), wherein Golkar itself was a party 
doi: 10.30589/pgr.v2i2.97
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that constantly reigned victorious in every 
General Election held during the New Order. 
Political offi  cials and the bureaucracy at all 
levels in the line ministries and regions were 
indistinguishable as to when one would be 
called a bureaucrat or a political offi  cial. The 
integration between the bureaucracy and 
political officials had subsequently led to a 
harmonious state in the domain of policy 
formulation and implementation. 
In terms of policy formulation by 
bureaucratic and political offi  cials, at the local 
level they did not have substantial authority 
to design policies. According to the principal-
agent concept, the principal is the person or 
entity that gives mandate to the agent to carry 
out a task within the corridors and provisions 
determined by the principal. Bureaucratic 
and political officials at the local level in 
the New Order era did not play the role of 
principal as they were the agent of the central 
government in the regions instead. Political 
officials did not have extensive authority, 
which resulted in minimal budget allocation 
and low creativity and innovation capacity in 
designing policies. Additionally, in terms of 
policy implementation, local political offi  cials 
would push bureaucratic offi  cials in the region 
to always succeed in implementing policies. 
Success in policy implementation was a main 
requirement to maintain one’s offi  cial position.
Eventually, the New Order was toppled 
and this ushered in the Reformation Era. The 
Reformation Era has examined the radical 
change in the relation of bureaucratic and 
political offi  cials both at the central and local 
levels. The bureaucracy at the very early stage 
of the Reformation Era had been returned 
to its original position to being impartial 
(non-partisan). Such position has allowed 
the bureaucracy to no longer become the 
political machine of those in power, it is 
entitled to develop public values and public 
administration ethics in a more independent 
manner. The bureaucracy’s position is further 
strengthened with the advent of Law No. 
5/2014 on Civil Service, which drives the 
bureaucracy into a more independent level and 
more oriented toward a merit system. 
The relation of bureaucrats and political 
officials in the Reformation Era at the local 
level is, thus, an interesting subject of study. 
The bureaucracy that had once been integrated 
with political offi  cials, has undergone change in 
the Reformation Era as it is now a dichotomy 
between bureaucratic and political officials. 
Such relational change will undoubtedly have 
ramifi cations in the arena of policy formulation 
and implementation. Policy values, which were 
initially indistinguishable between those of 
bureaucrats and those of political offi  cials, should 
be more clearly comprehensible post-reform. 
The bureaucracy’s independence post-
reform at the local level in terms of policy 
implementation in the Reformation Era is an 
interesting case to study in Tegal Municipality 
because the relation of bureaucratic and political 
offi  cials there indicates a prevalent disharmony 
between the two. This was demonstrated with 
Tegal Municipality’s civil servants having the 
audacity to criticize their mayor in the form of 
protests held from the month of April through 
May of 2015. Tegal’s civil servants felt that 
there had been abuse of power by arrogant 
political offi  cials in the form of excessive political 
intervention in matt ers of public administration. 
In the case of the protests by Tegal’s civil servants, 
the Mayor responded by discharging 14 offi  cials, 
which consisted of 9 Echelon II personnel and 5 
echelon III personnel, from their post, this was 
subsequently followed by fi ring the Director of 
the Tegal Municipality PDAM (State-Owned 
Water Company) who delivered a speech during 
the protests (Firdaus, 2015; Nugroho, 2015). 
The disharmonious condition between 
the bureaucratic and political offi  cials in Tegal 
Municipality consequently leads to a question 
of utmost importance, namely: How were the 
relations between bureaucratic and political 
officials in policy implementation during 
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the New Order and the Reformation Era in 
Tegal Municipality? This is an interesting 
question to pursue and study as it may 
reveal the bureaucracy’s position within the 
implementation arena in the New Order 
and post-bureaucratic impartiality in the 
Reformation Era, as well as reveal what would 
the bureaucracy do when there are opposing 
values between bureaucratic values and policy 
values desired by political offi  cials.
Methods
This  research was conducted by 
employing the qualitative approach. Data 
collection was carried out through in-
depth interviews, focus group discussions, 
documentation, and observations. In-depth 
interviews were conducted with 28 respondents 
considered as having the capacity to elaborate 
the relations of bureaucratic and political 
officials in implementing policies since the 
New Order until the Reformation Era in Tegal 
Municipality. The 28 respondents comprised 
of ten Echelon II offi  cials, seven Echelon III 
offi  cials, four Echelon IV offi  cials, Chairperson 
of PWRI (Retired Civil Servants’ Association), 
Chairperson of DPRD (Regional People’s 
Representative Assembly), two former mayors, 
a former vice-mayor, a ruling mayor, and a 
staff of BKD (Regional Personnel Agency). 
Focus group discussions (FGDs) were also 
held by involving Echelon II offi  cials on three 
separate occasions. The fi rst FGD was att ended 
by fi ve Echelon II offi  cials, the second FGD 
was att ended by three Echelon II offi  cials, and 
the third FGD was att ended by three Echelon 
II officials and an Echelon III personnel. In 
addition to conducting in-depth interviews and 
FGDs, certain documents were also obtained 
and used as secondary data in this research, 
which were Tegal Municipality’s RPJMD 
(Regional Mid-Term Development Plan), Map 
of Tegal Municipality, and Statistics on Tegal 
Municipality. Observations of bureaucratic 
activities following the tension between 
political officials and career bureaucrats in 
Tegal Municipality were also carried out in 
order to investigate deeper into the relations 
occurring between bureaucratic and political 
offi  cials in the municipality. 
The data analysis process began by 
analyzing all the available data and the various 
resources, namely the interviews, formal 
documents, personal documents, fi gures, and 
so forth (Moleong, 1990). Once data had been 
collected in the form of interview and FGD 
recordings with transcriptions, as well as the 
notes from observation results, data check and 
compilation were conducted. When data was 
still considered insuffi  cient aft er conducting data 
check and compilation, the researchers would 
return to the fi eld to obtain the necessary data. 
The collected data were then reduced 
merely into data that are relevant with the 
focus of study and selected as references in data 
analysis. Once the data have been reduced, it 
was subsequently classifi ed according to the 
focus of study. The reduced data were then 
triangulated by verifying FGD/interview 
results with FGDs/interviews; FGDs/interviews 
with documents; and FGDs/interviews with 
observation results. The data is then presented 
in the form of narratives and case boxes in 
accordance with the focus of study. The result 
of triangulation is subsequently considered as a 
conclusion. The data analysis activities carried 
out in this research were made to fulfi ll the 
criteria of interactive data analysis proposed 
by Miles and Huberman (1992), which include 
three main components of data analysis, which 
are: data reduction; data presentation; and 
conclusion.   
Relational Patterns of Bureaucratic and 
Pol i t ica l  Off ic ia ls  in   Public  Pol icy 
Implementation:  Compliance and Conflict 
of Value
Weber and Hegel stated that one of 
Public Administration’s att ributes is that the 
political fi gure stands at the apex of leadership 
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(Shaw, 1992). This confirms that there are 
two distinct powers in the bureaucracy: the 
political power that is based on constituency 
and the bureaucratic power that is based 
on skills. Political officials who develop 
their accountability to the electorates will 
strive for the maximum benefit possible 
for the sake of their voters. Whereas career 
bureaucrats develop their accountability to 
their professional colleagues, to the wider 
public and to the extent that their efforts 
achieve organizational objectives (Alesina & 
Tabellini, 2007). Thus, even in the domain of 
implementation, bureaucratic offi  cials must 
resiliently maintain alignment with their public 
values.
 A complementarity relationship where 
one complements another will happen when 
the level of control exercised by political 
offi  cials and the level of neutrality exhibited 
by career offi  cials (administrators) are high. 
At such level, political officials will take 
heed of the administration’s competence 
and commitment, while administrators will 
be committed to become more accountable 
and responsive. Political offi  cials and career 
offi  cials can complement each other, depend 
on each other, and reciprocally influence 
one another. This is achieved by maintaining 
their distinctive roles based on their unique 
perspectives and values. Both political and 
career offi  cials must understand the diff erences 
of their formal positions and admit that at times 
they may well overlap (Svara, 2001).
Dunn and Legge Jr. (2002) opine that 
there are three approach models pertaining to 
the relationship between elected bureaucrats 
and career bureaucrats, namely: the orthodox 
politic-administration dichotomy; the modifi ed 
orthodox politic-administration dichotomy; 
and the partnership model. The relational 
patt erns between political and career offi  cials 
in the classical school of administration tends 
to separate the politic and administration 
arenas. The political arena is truly the purview 
of political offi  cials, while career offi  cials are 
those responsible for implementing policies 
(implementers). This school is known as the 
orthodox public administration school of 
thought. It has subsequently developed into 
the modifi ed orthodox public administration 
school, which tries to provide more space for 
career offi  cials to design policies in areas where 
political offi  cials lack the capacity to do so. Fox 
and Jordan (2011) state that the task delegation 
by political actors to the bureaucracy is indeed 
carried out, theoretically, by politicians as it 
allows them to shy away from full responsibility 
of policies that lessen voters’ interest. Politicians 
would not delegate if the policy is aligned 
with the voters’ interest. Concerning the 
question of whether delegation has negative 
impacts on the public, the answer depends on 
to what extent should bureaucratic expertise 
be exerted to make up for the politicians’ 
lack of discipline. The last school of thought, 
known as the contemporary approach, is the 
partnership school, which positions political 
and career offi  cials as partners in their eff orts 
of fulfi lling public interests, draft ing pro-public 
policies, and more satisfying provision of 
public services.
Diff erent to the opinions of Dunn and 
Legge Jr. (2002), based on the literature search, 
three main approaches concerning the relational 
patt ern of political and career offi  cials were 
found. The three approaches are: the political 
control approach; the bureaucratic autonomy 
approach; and the partnership approach. The 
control approach believes that political offi  cials 
must have control over career offi  cials. This is 
the most dominant approach in the study of 
relational patt erns between political and career 
offi  cials, so it is no surprise that it has developed 
into numerous variants. The bureaucratic 
autonomy approach considers career offi  cials 
as beings that possess professional expertise 
and are capable of responding to the public 
via policies and public services. In order 
to properly implement public policies and 
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deliver public services, career offi  cials must be 
positioned as independent beings, unrestricted 
by political and external interventions. The 
third approach, partnership, believes in an 
equivalent relation between political and career 
offi  cials in administering public aff airs. Such 
equivalent relation would allow for public 
interests to be discussed more massively and 
properly by both political and career offi  cials. 
The bureaucrats’ proportion of impartiality 
and politicians’ political control become unique 
points that should be considered in developing 
partnership between career and political 
offi  cials.
The classical perspective considers 
that task of public bureaucracy as purely 
instrumental as it relates to the efforts of 
making more efficient program and policy 
implementation (Dobuzinskis, 1997). The 
Classic Public Administration school believes 
that career offi  cials are not entitled to give value 
and they are merely implementing offi  cers. As 
a consequence, career offi  cials must remain 
neutral in policy implementation and they have 
no responsibility of having to be “accountable” 
to the public. Bureaucratic offi  cials are only 
responsible to political officials, and it is 
political offi  cials who are accountable to the 
public. Bureaucratic offi  cials are a neutral entity 
that cannot be demanded to be more in favor of 
the public, because they are solely accountable 
to their superior the political offi  cials. Career 
offi  cials in the Classical Public Administration 
School, thus, adhere to a doctrine of mono-
loyalty, which is the single loyalty and absolute 
compliance career officials have toward 
political offi  cials. 
Public Administration scholars who 
prioritizes the efficiency value have been 
criticized because they are considered to 
have let Public Administration become an 
underdeveloped field of study. The next 
generation of Public Administration scholars 
have subsequently attempted to take 
administration into the domain of political 
science studies. They are of the opinion that 
Public Administration should intermingle 
with politics to discuss about policies. 
The implementers who possess numerous 
experiences in policy must play a role in 
policymaking. Public Administration should 
discuss about procedural and substantial 
policies to produce good policies (Waldo, 
1952; Simon et al., 1952; Harmon, 1989). Such 
developing Public Administration value 
has led Adams (1992) to argue that Public 
Administration should have two dimensions: 
the political dimension and the epistemological 
dimension. These two dimensions will bear 
consequences on Public Administration’s 
nature of having to be open to every scientifi c 
study. When Public Administration is required 
to have a clear locus and focus (Golembiewski, 
1974; Henry, 1975; Daneke, 1990), the developing 
public values may become a reference and 
a substantial part in the efforts of defining 
Public Administration as a signifi cant science 
(Kirkhart, 1984; Jun, 1993; Pesch, 2008; Riccucci, 
2010). 
The debate regarding value gained 
considerable traction following the first 
Minnowbrook Conference in 1968 which 
included social justice as a value that should 
be incorporated in Public Administration 
and policy formulation. Ethics, honesty, 
and accountability in governance should 
become the lexicons of Public Administration. 
The Minnowbrook perspective argues 
that when societal needs change, public 
institutions often last longer than they’re 
intended to (Frederickson, 1989). New Public 
Administration was, thus, created to direct 
public organizations to be more oriented 
toward the citizens instead of the bureaucracy 
(Frederickson, 1975; Cruise, 1997). The fi rst 
Minnowbrook Conference  brought about three 
themes of substantial changes on social justice, 
ethics, and citizen participation (Esquith, 
1997). The second Minnowbrook Conference 
was rather similar, social justice value was 
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still a warm topic of discussion, which was 
complemented with issues of reconciling Public 
Administration with democracy, ethics, and 
human relations. 
Public administration values have, 
thus, developed from what was initially 
limited to effectiveness and efficiency, with 
the value of social justice. The addition of 
social justice value had compelled Public 
Administration to be sensitive to the public. It 
needs to fi nd a balance between demands of 
competitive performance and enforcement of 
values of justice, equality, and accountability 
(Cohen & Gershgoren, 2013). Values in Public 
Administration have continued to develop, 
resulting in the suggestion of making happiness 
as a value that should be developed by Public 
Administration in the future (Okulicz-kozaryn, 
2016). 
Rutgers (2015) posits that “public values 
are enduring beliefs in the organization of and 
activities in a society that are regarded as crucial 
or desirable—positively or negatively—for the 
existence, functioning, and sustainability of 
that society—instant or distant—the well-
being of its members—directly or indirectly--, 
and present and/or future—in reference 
to an—implicit or explicit—encompassing 
normative ideal of human society”. Whereas 
Bozeman (2007, p. 13) expounds that public 
values of a society are those that provide 
normative consensus regarding (a) the rights, 
benefi t, and prerogatives citizens should (and 
should not) be entitled to; (b) the obligations 
of citizens to society, state, and one another; 
and (c) principles that the governments and 
policies should be based upon. When the 
bureaucracy faces a rule violating a higher 
objective, or if there were confl icting rules, or 
if they had discretionary space, civil servants 
must make choices appropriate to public 
values (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard & Musheno, 
2003). The personal values of the bureaucracy 
in the implementation domain have increased 
the opportunity for them to find their own 
intellectual space and infl uence the character 
and quality of implementation available in local 
communities (O’Sullivan, 2016). The structure 
and process of policy implementation must 
interact and refl ect the values and beliefs of 
implementers (Ryan, 1999).
The Reformation Era has brought 
about the freedom of speech, assembly, and 
association. Dahl (1998) states that there are six 
political institutions required in a democracy, 
one of them is freedom of expression. Freedom 
of expression includes the critical attitude 
that career offi  cials demonstrate concerning 
public interests, and concerning the policies 
of political offi  cials. Political actors sitt ing at 
the peak of bureaucracy feel that they are the 
ones aff orded with legitimate sovereignty to 
manage bureaucrats. Whereas bureaucrats feel 
that in the era of democracy they are entitled 
to demonstrate their accountability directly 
to the public, by channeling their aspirations 
openly, despite having to oppose the peak 
leadership of the bureaucracy (political offi  cial) 
in their region. Such confl ict between political 
and career officials subsequently leads to a 
precarious situation wherein career offi  cials 
become ineffi  cient and political offi  cials become 
unresponsive (Karl, 1987). 
The professionalism of administrators 
is also mentioned in the discussion on the 
relationship between political and career 
offi  cials. When an administrator is required 
to be professional, the necessary criteria are 
education, competence, appropriateness of 
action with code of ethics, and experience. 
Meanwhile, public administrators should 
also carry a mission of public interest 
(Kearney & Sinha, 1988). The middle way is 
by placing importance on responsiveness and 
professionalism in the design and operation 
of a democratic bureaucracy in which each 
requires constant maintenance (Rourke, 1992 
& 1960). Toren (1976) shows proof that the 
relation of bureaucracy and professionalism 
m a y  b e  c l a s s i f i e d  i n t o  t wo  g e n e r a l 
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categories: (a) structural hierarchy shows 
that organizations possessing hierarchical 
authority and professional expertise not only 
can coexist within organizations but they can 
also form variations together; and (b) rules in 
the bureaucracy are not always violated by 
prevailing professional and pro-public oriented 
values. In the European Parliament case, in 
certain conditions the European Parliament 
offi  cials play a substantial role to direct the 
decision-making process in European Union 
(Neuhold & Dobbels, 2015). The offi  cials may 
have signifi cant impact on the policy-making 
process, and this phenomenon refutes the 
dualistic Weberian approach that distinguishes 
politicians as decision makers and offi  cials as 
executors.
The Reformation Era has ushered in 
new and extraordinary impacts indicated by 
bolder bureaucrats who are open to reveal the 
diff erences in the values they and the political 
leaders hold. This has led to a vulnerability to 
confl ict between political offi  cials and career 
offi  cials in the Reformation Era. This has been 
proven when an intense confl ict occurs about 
a particular issue between the professional 
bureaucrats and political actors, there are 
lobbying eff orts conducted by interest groups 
not only to political actors, but to professional 
bureaucrats as well (McKay, 2011). 
Citizens in the era of democracy and 
sophisticated information technology gain 
information on outcome, performance, and 
behavior of politicians (political leaders) 
through the media (including the internet, TV, 
radio), through private hearings and collective 
assemblies. This are manifestations of political 
offi  cials’ accountability to citizens. Concurrently, 
public sector organizations (career offi  cials) 
promotes accountability by allowing the 
public to participate at certain levels in the 
decision-making process (Monfardini, 2010). 
Greitens (2012) has also brought back the 
discussion on multiple accountability, which is 
an issue and challenge for the bureaucracy. The 
bureaucracy is currently under the pressure of 
multiple accountability, such as legal, political, 
bureaucratic, and professional accountabilities 
simultaneously. 
The Contemporary Public Administration 
School believes that career offi  cials, aside from 
maintaining their loyalty to political offi  cials, 
are also required to remain loyal to the public in 
policy formulation and implementation. Dual 
loyalty in this modern bureaucracy is surely 
infl uenced by on-going democratization and 
good governance, which urges governments 
to be more transparent, accountable, and 
responsive. Career offi  cials required to serve 
the two undoubtedly have difficulties in 
making it work. Career officials must be 
able to link both interests: political offi  cials’ 
aspirations and public aspirations. Political 
offi  cials’ aspirations (instructions) loaded with 
political contents and debts are frequently 
diff erent from public aspirations. In the public 
policy stage, the bureaucracy must be able to 
demonstrate its allegiance to public values and 
employ its professionalism to compose policies 
capable of addressing public issues. Schnose 
(2015) found that bureaucratic professionalism 
can partly explain the change of allocation for 
“ideological” budget category and its positive 
correlation with policy stability the world over. 
The Bureaucracy’s  Compliance in the 
Implementation Arena of the New Order 
The bulk of political and bureaucratic 
officials’ work in the regions pertained to 
implementing programs mandated by the 
central government. The bureaucratic and 
political offi  cials’ relationship during the New 
Order, thus, illustrates a government ruling 
with an iron fist. The central government 
pressured the subnational governments to 
be able to implement the programs, then the 
political offi  cials at the regional level pressured 
the regional bureaucracy to implement central 
policies. Sensible dialogs between bureaucrats 
and political offi  cials in the regions to produce a 
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more innovative and creative policy formulation 
or programs did not take place during the 
New Order. The subnational governments 
merely implemented the policies of the central 
government. 
The relationship between bureaucratic and 
political offi  cials had consequently become unfi t 
as the regional governments were responsible 
to the central government for implementing its 
programs, resulting in political offi  cials in the 
regions putt ing pressures on their subordinates 
to constantly succeed in every program and 
policy. This had led to policies becoming mere lip 
service in order for regional bureaucratic offi  cials 
to be safe from the pressures applied by regional 
political offi  cials, and regional political offi  cials 
being safe from the pressures of political offi  cials 
in the central government. This subsequently 
resulted in data that “asal bapak senang” (keep 
the boss happy). The relation of bureaucratic and 
political offi  cials in the New Order can, thus, be 
described as being relatively one-sided, there 
was no discussion conducted by policy actors 
to explore public policies more sensitive to the 
people’s needs. 
Upon observing this phenomenon with 
the concept of dichotomy or integration of 
bureaucratic and political officials, we will 
find that the constellation of bureaucratic 
and political offi  cials during the New Order 
indicates an integration of bureaucratic and 
political officials. However, the integration 
of these offi  cials was not in terms of coming 
to an agreement in designing public policies 
relatively more sensitive to the people, but what 
had occurred was an integration of bureaucratic 
and political offi  cials depicting an authoritarian 
regime. A regime in which the bureaucracy 
had become incapable of demonstrating its 
professionalism and political officials were 
pressured not to make their vision and mission 
into a reality, but to focus their eff orts more on 
serving the central government instead. 
The relation of bureaucratic and 
political offi  cials in the New Order reinforces 
the assertion that many political officials 
have been conducting political control over 
the bureaucracy by two means: first is by 
counter staff s and second is by managerialism 
(Sukmajati, 2013). The former means, counter 
staff, has been discussed in the previous 
passages, as for managerialism, the New 
Order regime had succeeded in controlling 
the bureaucracy by pressuring it to remain 
in their arena as policy implementers and 
not as an entity that should be entitled to the 
opportunity, due to their professionalism, 
experience, and technocratic skills, to design 
policies. Once political officials succeed in 
applying managerialism, bureaucratic offi  cials 
become incapable of designing public policy. 
This was the situation prevalent in the New 
Order, it was a time when the bureaucratic 
officials were merely managers of policy 
implementers instead of playing a role as think 
tanks producing public policy analyses at the 
local level. 
The New Order phenomenon above is 
quite diff erent from the concept introduced 
by initiators of the principal agent theory. The 
principal agent theory shows that there are 
principals and agents (implementers) within 
governments. The phenomenon happening 
at the local level during the New Order 
could not illustrate that, because the political 
officials in the regions were agents of the 
central government that constantly acted as 
the principal. Since the regional governments 
acted as agents, they consequently did not 
have enough space to operate as a principal. 
Hence, when political offi  cials were positioned 
as principals at the regional level, they were 
unable to conduct matters beyond their 
authority. The New Order period can, thus, 
be described as a time when regional political 
offi  cials were agents of the central government 
who played the role of the principal. 
This is almost similar to other countries, 
for regional public administration to be 
regarded of decent quality, then it should have a 
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high level of integrity to the central government. 
Such integrity to the central government is 
exercised in order to increase the public’s trust 
in actions taken by the regional government. 
The locally elected offi  cials must truly obey the 
legal regime that regulates confl ict of interests 
and incompatibility, if this were disregarded by 
the political offi  cials, they will be at risk of being 
declared incompatible with the government 
and there will be clash of interests. In Romania, 
the administrative authority ensures the 
compliance of locally elected officials to 
legal provisions, and confl ict of interests are 
managed by an institution named National 
Integrity Agency (Apostolache, 2015).
When we analyze the relation of 
bureaucratic and political officials using 
the concept of political control, it can be 
construed that aft er political offi  cials succeeded 
in rendering the bureaucrats into mere 
managers, the New Order also succeeded 
in comprehending the concept of political 
control while they were using the concept 
of bureaucratic insulation as a shield so the 
bureaucracy could not be easily intervened 
by political actors aside from Golkar. Mono 
loyalty of personnel was a very eff ective means 
of maintaining the New Order’s public policy. 
This can, for instance, be observed in the 
‘yellowization’ (kuningisasi) program during 
the New Order in Central Java, where no 
one complained and no one discussed it as a 
political color. This was easily justifi ed as the 
mascot of Central Java is the golden orioles 
which is yellow in color, so it was not highly 
unusual for all walls to be painted yellow. When 
this policy was implemented, it could almost 
be assured that the regional government and 
the bureaucracy were safe from any counter 
policy. No one dared to mention that it could 
not be done. 
During the New Order, the political control 
exerted by the mayor upon the bureaucracy 
was strictly implemented. The bureaucracy at 
the time had truly become Golkar’s political 
machine. The bureaucracy would ensure 
that all the civil servants elected Golkar and 
actively assist in winning its campaign in every 
election. The main characteristic of political 
offi  cials’ political control over the bureaucracy 
during the New Order was the inseparability 
of bureaucratic and political officials. This 
resulted in a strict monitoring order that 
added another pressure to the bureaucracy. 
The bureaucracy had to work optimally to 
show that the ruling regime is really capable of 
implementing policies for the sake of providing 
welfare and prosperity to the people. When 
development policies implemented by a mayor 
and the bureaucracy were declared successful, 
Golkar would reap benefi t from that. Mayors 
were, thus, signifi cantly concerned with the 
prestige of policy implementations conducted 
in their region. Massive pressures were a 
necessity to ensure that all policies run within 
the determined path, particularly since all 
aspects of development policies during the 
New Order tended to be national development 
programs centrally designed by the national 
government. 
This is in line with the findings of 
McVey (1982) who states that the New Order 
bureaucracy is similar to the style of the 
Dutch East Indies Colonial government in 
the 1930s. The Dutch East Indies had at the 
time introduced development, efficiency, 
and modern principles. The bureaucracy of 
that period illustrates Beambtenstaat, which is 
similar to the concept of bureaucracy polity 
introduced by Rigss and characterized by 
insulating the policy-making process from a 
process of broad public participation (through 
representation), and putt ing more emphasis on 
the bureaucracy. This was made possible due to 
the presence of exceedingly substantial power 
and political demobilization.   
The integration of bureaucratic and 
political offi  cials during the New Order does 
not depict an ideal condition illustrating 
their unity in designing pro public policies, 
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what we have observed here is a deviant 
form of integration. The deviant integration 
demonstrates the union of bureaucratic 
and political officials in the regions acting 
as agents of the central government that 
acted as the principal. The relation between 
the regional government (bureaucratic and 
political offi  cials of the regional government) 
and the central government during the New 
Order was similar to the relation between 
the federal government and the states in a 
federation (Hedge et al., 1991). The model 
in “An Expanded Principal-Agent Model of 
Regulatory Federalism describes how most of 
the states’ policy formulations are actually 
intervened by federal government’s policies. 
The subnational governments in the New 
Order era also went through similar experience 
when many of their policy formulations 
(authorities) were intervened or directed by the 
central government. This kind of relationship 
is indeed beneficial to the federal (central) 
government because it ensures (controls) the 
state’s interests to be implemented properly 
by the subnational governments. Meanwhile, 
this is absolutely unfavorable to the states 
(regional governments) because they do not 
have suffi  cient space to formulate policies that 
are “authentically” local, and the capacity of 
policy makers in the regions are not honed to 
design good policies. 
If bureaucratic and political offi  cials were 
to truly realized the principal-agent relation, 
they should have been able to refine their 
selves to become exceptional individuals. This 
is because, in a principal-agent relationship, 
the agent should comprise of individuals 
possessing excellent skills in policy design. 
Zhang et al. (2012, p. 194) reveal the most 
necessary skills and knowledge to be an 
agent (manager) in policy making, namely: a) 
communication skills that include listening, 
developing compromise and consensus, 
writing, and face-to-face communication; b) 
fi nancial management and budgeting skills; 
c) information technology skills; d) regional 
government structure; e) research and analytical 
capacity; f) ethical practice competence; g) 
human resource management skills; and h) 
strategic planning and management skills.
Demir and Nyhan (2008) assert that 
neutral competence has a negative impact 
on democratic accountability and only partly 
explains planning capacity. Meanwhile, 
elected officials admit the substantial role 
of subordinates in public administration. 
Whereas political guidelines have no signifi cant 
impact on the planning capacity of public 
administrators. Political guidelines play a 
greater role in terms of legitimizing policy 
initiatives and amendments once a policy 
has been implemented with the help of 
administrators.
Confl ict of Value between the Bureaucracy and 
Political Offi  cials in Policy Implementation 
during the Reformation Era before the Civil 
Service Law
It is indeed an interesting matt er when 
the bureaucracy complains about a policy. 
This commonly occurs in the domain of 
policy implementation. When a policy has 
been seized by political offi  cials, bureaucratic 
officials would on occasion intentionally 
delay or even att empt to thwart said policy. 
An offi  cial shared a story when she/he was a 
section head during Mayor Ikmal Jaya’s term in 
offi  ce. She/he intentionally delayed the mayor’s 
instruction because she/he considered that 
it was something well beyond the standard 
ethics of bureaucracy and was dangerous to 
him/herself, the mayor, and the bureaucracy. 
The bureaucracy was concerned that if it were 
to submit to the political offi  cial, then it would 
have become a substantial risk to him/herself 
and the political offi  cial. This had given him/
her the courage to delay. He admitt ed to being 
summoned and reprimanded specifi cally by 
the mayor since his/her efforts to delay the 
policy was found out by the mayor through 
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a leak made by his/her subordinate. This was 
the Bokong Semar case, which had ultimately 
brought the mayor to be placed behind bars. 
Concerning this case, the bureaucracy 
had internally conveyed a warning that what 
the Mayor was about to do could be extremely 
dangerous if continued further.  He/she stated 
that the mayor’s policy had been stalled for 
nearly a year. This is what political offi  cials 
call “bureaucratic stalling”. The bureaucracy 
stalls by saying “yes”, while actually “not 
doing anything”. To political offi  cials, this is 
considered as insubordination (bureaucratic 
insubordination), yet to the bureaucracy this 
is a means for them to play nice in the face 
of political officials, wherein the existing 
condition does not allow bureaucratic offi  cials 
to go against the political offi  cials’ policies. 
Civil servants can never only be the ‘servants’ 
of ‘political bosses’ because they carry out 
highly signifi cant measures in the execution 
of public authority or in the development and 
implementation of public policies. The loyalty 
of civil servants is by no means similar to the 
loyalty an employee would commonly aff ord 
to the employer (Sossin, 2005).
M o d e r n  p u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , 
particularly in the context of impartial 
civil servants, are often accused of being 
insubordinate to elected politicians. This is 
partly influenced by the literature on New 
Public Management which opines that today’s 
public administrators must ensure quality 
services, provide value to public budget, 
be responsive, operate strategically, uphold 
organization’s reputation, and so forth. These 
are the reason why they seem to serve many 
masters, not only politicians, but also various 
interests that are aligned at times and quite 
frequently oppose one another (Graaf, 2011). 
Administrators attempting to stall policy 
implementation merely consider that the 
removal of the program would be more 
benefi cial than its implementation. In relation 
to this, administrators also serve as the savior 
of taxpayers’ money or the savior of public 
budget. Drometer’s (2012) research indicates 
that the bureaucracy holds a signifi cant role 
in public budgeting. The study shows that 
bureaucrats have a unique infl uence because 
they favor (prioritize) numerous supply of 
public goods thereby increasing investment 
Case 1.
Offi  cials of the Reformation Era (Pre Civil Service Law) 
Stalling Policy Implementation
Offi  cial B4 stated that the political offi  cial had instructed to implement a policy that deviated beyond 
the path of public values. The bureaucracy, as the more experienced party, would naturally fi nd out 
whether the policy violates the rules. Once it had been understood that the policy is a violation, 
the bureaucracy would provide counsel to cease its implementation. Nevertheless, according to B4, 
the political offi  cial had frequently exercised his/her discretion regarding the matt er. While in fact, 
exercising discretion is acceptable given that it does not violate rules or regulations. When the political 
offi  cial had stated that the policy is at his/her discretion and that it should be continued, the bureaucracy 
could, according to B4, stall the policy because it opposed ethics of public administration. B4 said that 
he/she and the Regional Secretary had stalled the policy concerning the Bokong Semar land swap, 
which ultimately ended with Mayor Ikmal Jaya being put on trial and convicted in court. B4 was even 
summoned specifi cally by the Mayor and reprimanded for having stalled the policy. The requirement 
that the land appraiser should be from an independent organization was not met. 
The land price infl ated and the Bokong Semar case had caused, according to the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK), around eight billion rupiahs’ loss to the state.  
Source: Result of interview with Informant B4 and research documentation.
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expenditure, hopefully this has an impact on 
the eff orts to restrict politicians’ latitude and 
thwart their  rent seeking att empts.
In addition, this demonstrates the 
vital role administrators play in policy 
implementation. Policy implementation 
transforms policy strategies and goals into 
daily operation activities (McCurley III, 1979). 
Street level organizations are crucial players in 
making public policies. The importance of these 
organizations is refl ected in the new public 
management strategy that aims to infl uence 
how street level organizations operate, partly, 
by “directing” discretionary practices through 
performance based incentives. The underlying 
assumption is that if the performance indicator 
provides a baseline and equal incentive (or fi ne), 
a person can assign policy implementation to 
street level organizations so they can determine 
the best means of executing the said policy 
(Brodkin, 2011). 
At the initial period of the Reformation Era, 
there had been indications of the bureaucracy 
defying the eff orts of political offi  cials who went 
beyond the path of regional government. These 
are good indications, namely the enthusiasm 
to maintain the bureaucracy remains on the 
right track, the track of keeping the regional 
government’s integrity and accountability. 
These seeds will become good investments to 
confront truly arrogant political offi  cials. 
Confl ict of Value between Bureaucratic and 
Political Offi  cials in Policy Implementation 
during the Reformation Era aft er the Civil 
Service Law
The relationship between bureaucratic 
and political offi  cials following the adoption 
of the Civil Service Law in Tegal Municipality 
in public policy was also indicated with 
phenomena of  bureaucrat ic  o f f i c ia ls 
intentionally stalling policy implementation. 
The bureaucratic stalling phenomenon at the 
policy implementation stage shows similar 
indications, that is when the bureaucracy 
witnessed deviations, bureaucrats would 
deliberately stall the regional head’s policy 
implementation. Up to that point,  the 
bureaucracy still has a significant role in 
policy implementation. The formulation, 
implementation, and evaluation of policy are an 
important united combination in public policy. 
Case 2. 
Offi  cials of the Reformation Era (Post Civil Service Law) 
Stalling Policy Implementation
There was an instruction given to execute a development project for one of the traditional 
markets in Tegal Municipality. At the time, a budget of 27 billion rupiahs was made available, in the 
fi rst stage as much as 9 billion rupiahs was to be disbursed. If the 9 billion disbursement had been 
successful, the 27 billion would   also be disbursed. However, according to the Head of the Regional 
Offi  ce – who had been discharged – such a huge project is an irresponsible one. The market that was 
to be developed was a new market that had been renovated on several years prior. The policy to 
develop this market had no strong and logical reasoning. This led to the assumption that the market 
development project was merely a “fake project” and the political offi  cial ultimately intended to reap a 
one-sided profi t from the project. 
The Regional Offi  ce Head and his/her subordinates (Echelon III and IV) had intentionally stalled 
the project so that the 9 billion would not be disbursed leaving the project without any implementation. 
This scenario was made by the bureaucrats who were convinced that it would be dishonorable if the 
project were to be realized, so they thought that it would be bett er if the project were discontinued and 
they succeeded in doing this. The Regional Offi  ce Head had received a warning from the Regional 
Head for being insubordinate.
Source: Results of FGD, and interviews with Informant B1 and Informant B2
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The dichotomy of political administration 
expecting bureaucratic offi  cials to not allocate 
values on policies is actually inaccurate. This 
study shows that the role of bureaucratic 
offi  cials is signifi cant in public policy.  When 
bureaucratic officials’ allocation of value is 
not contained in policy formulation, they 
could play their cards in the domain of policy 
implementation. The relationship between 
bureaucratic and political offi  cials in public 
policy is a necessity that should be properly 
maintained by both sides. In the coming period, 
accountable evidences and pro public values 
will serve as references in designing policies. 
Evidence-based public policy will, thus, be 
of utmost importance to further develop. 
Scientifi cally tested evidences can be developed 
by both sides to assist in designing democratic 
and rational public policies. 
Conclusion
The bureaucracy, which has long been 
known as the “obedient creature” in policy 
implementation, has been able to demonstrate 
in the Reformation Era that they have the 
capacity to maintain idealistic values of 
bureaucratic ethics and defend public budget. 
The bureaucracy with their knowledge and 
experiences have the instinct to survive, and one 
of their means of survival from the pressures 
of political officials’ policies is by being 
opportunistic (two-faced). They undertake 
eff orts of intentionally postponing, or in their 
own words stalling policy implementation. 
Policies are accepted as instructions, yet 
they intentionally buy some time to thwart 
the implementation of certain policies. Their 
boldness for stalling policy implementation 
has actually begun since the onset of the 
Reformation. In the Tegal Municipality cases, 
bureaucrats embarked on this endeavor 
merely because they were convinced that the 
Mayors/political offi  cials had come up with 
fl awed policies, which are policies that revolve 
around the political offi  cials’ personal fi nancial 
interests and do not align with public values. 
This research demonstrates that the 
dichotomy of bureaucratic and political 
offi  cials at the local level in the Reformation 
Era is diff erent from the defi nition of politic-
administration dichotomy introduced in 
the early stages of Public Administration 
studies. In the classical politic-administration 
dichotomy, the bureaucracy is not allowed 
space to allocate their values (neutrality 
principle) rendering them to be accountable 
only to the political offi  cial. In the relationship 
between bureaucratic and political officials 
during the Reformation Era which promotes 
impartiality and merit system, political offi  cials 
experience dichotomy with the bureaucracy, 
yet the bureaucracy is still given space to 
allocate their values in policies. Bureaucrats 
believing that there are values opposing public 
interests in the implementation domain will go 
against political offi  cials by thwarting policy 
implementation. In the Tegal case, confl ict of 
value had caused failure in implementation, but 
this proves that the bureaucracy had succeeded 
in defending public values in its true form. 
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